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STRATEGY AND EXPERIENCE
It is almost with disbelief that we learn that in 1965, the general assessment of Korea by the foreign-aid establishment was that it was "the hell-hole of foreign assistance", a "bottomless pit" and a "hopeless case". That's according to a major economic adviser in the design of Korea's Second Five Year Plan (Adelman 2007) . [1] By 1996, the year when Korea was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a group to which only high-income countries can be a are invited to be members, its Gross Domestic Product per head was US$16, 099, which marked an increase of 6.6 times its corresponding level in 1970 of US$2,432. Both figures are at constant 2005 prices, converted to have purchasing power parity. [2] An independent Commission on Growth and Development (2008) identified 13 economic "success stories", which have grown since 1950 at an average rate of at least 7% for 25 years or longer. At that pace of expansion, an economy almost doubles in size every decade. And Korea is one of those fast-growing economies. [3] From 1960 to 1979, the nation grew on average by 8% yearly. During this period, it implemented a targeted industrialization strategy focused on low-technology and light industries. Aside from achieving sustained economic growth, it has also shown great ability to recover from crises. After the 1979 oil shock, the nation rapidly recovered and regained an average yearly growth of 8.8% from 1981 to the mid-1990s. During this period, it shifted to support heavy industries oriented toward the export market.
In this brief essay on Korea's rapid economic growth, we focus our attention from the 1960s to the time when it joined the OECD in 1996, a period marked by its industrialization drive and structural transformation. Our interest is on its strategy of export-driven industrialization.
From experience, we know that one who goes through the literature on Korean economic growth can easily get bogged down in the detailed twists and turns of its economic history. So we have chosen in this essay to look at the forest, not the trees, and to present the broad contours of its economic development. Our modest goal is to make the Korean growth experience a matter of interest for the non-specialist on Korea, as well as for any reader with an interest in development.
In the sections that follow, we will look at three selected ingredients of the Korean model of industrialization, namely: 1) its outward orientation and export push, 2) its climb up the ladder of comparative advantage, and 3) its economic management of the industrialization effort. In the final segment, we reflect on the lessons from the Korean economic miracle.
Outward Orientation and Export Push
An important element of Korea's industrialization strategy is its emphasis on manufactured exports. Export targets were specified by product, market, and exporting firm. As one practitioner remarked, the export figures "were the only statistics that could not be faked" --they were easily confirmable from bills of lading emanating from a single dominant port and trade-partner country records (Noland and Pack 2005) .
Exports were interpreted as a relatively clean measure of the relative competitiveness of domestic producers --local firms might be able to charge high prices in the small, protected domestic market, but this was not possible in the global marketplace. The export orientation and export metric provided a well-placed emphasis on performance in international markets as a barometer of success (see Table 1 ). Bank (1993) , in Weiss (2005) , pp 3-4
For a nation to choose in the 1960s the path of the export push was to swim against the tide of development consensus. Most of the developing world opted to attempt to build industries that produced substitutes for imported products kept out of the domestic markets by means of high tariffs and import restrictions. Hence, the sole focus of other nations was the domestic market. However, Korea studied Japan's earlier and contemporary policy experiences carefully and copied many of them (sometimes perhaps, even to its own detriment). The nation regarded Japan as the 'pathfinding explorer' (Young 2006) .
The nation has promoted exports since the mid-1960s through a number of channels. First, the existing multiple exchange rate system was abolished, and the new unitary exchange rate was set and then managed to support the production activities of local 'comparatively advantageous' industries (Westphal 1990) . Second, export subsidies and import concessions linked to exports were put in place to achieve the nation's export targets (OECD 2012) . Third, free trade export promotion zones were established. [4] Korea started its export push by focusing on manufactured exports of labor-intensive technologically simple goods, such as clothing, footwear, processed food, sports goods, and toys. The nation began its export-led growth by means of a triangular trade with Japan, on which it depended for the supply of intermediate and capital goods, and with the United States, Korea's largest and main export market. With continued economic growth and industrial catch-up, the export markets as well as industrial structure diversified. The developing economies became increasingly important as export markets, while the nation exported more heavy and chemical industry goods.
Climbing Up the Ladder of Comparative Advantage
In the 1960s, the government had identified labor-intensive manufactures as holding great promise for exports, but export promotion did not target specific industries or firms when providing incentives. It overcame the initial export pessimism ("Who would buy our products?") and let comparative advantage operate and focused its efforts on labor-intensive industries. It imported raw materials, intermediate inputs, and capital goods and used its cheap, high-quality labor to produce exports such as clothing and footwear.
However, the government was well-aware that outward orientation by itself was not enough to sustain growth. From the second half of the 1960s, it made concerted efforts to move into higher value-added segments along the value chain by making complementary investments in human capital and infrastructure. In pursuing industrial upgrading, the government looked thoroughly into what had to be done to fill the missing links in the domestic value chain and move up the quality ladder, and made conscious efforts to aim for international competitiveness from the outset (see Table 2 ). After exploiting its comparative advantage to develop labor-intensive industries industries downstream, it sought to produce the intermediate inputs imported from foreign upstream industries through the acquisition of technology, the development of human resources, and the construction of optimal-scale plants aimed for the world markets. For example, in the chemical-textile value chain, the nation systematically built the links backward from export of textiles to production of synthetic fibers, to development of basic petrochemicals (see Table 3 ).
Although capacity underutilization turned out to be a major problem at the end of the 1970s, the heavy and chemical industry (HCI) drive provided the foundation of many of the nation's leading industries, such as steel, shipbuilding, machinery, electronics, and petrochemicals (see Table 4 ). It strengthened significantly backward and forward linkages among these industries, as well as related industries such as automobiles, to increase the local content of exports (Lim 2011) . It also enabled the nation to develop its own defense industry.
Economic Management of the Industrialization Effort
The industrialization drive requires quite a considerable effort from the government and industry. Initiating the industrial take-off and then coordinating to ensure that the push to industrialize be sustained requires both planning and continued monitoring of the economy.
In Korea, the government body that was responsible for the planning and coordination effort was the Economic Planning Board (EPB), which was created in 1961. As one scholar of Korean public administration puts it, "it is hard to imagine the successful economic development of South Korea without the EPB" (Choi 2014) . It occupied the center of the nation's economic policy making and coordination structure, and had a great deal of control over other economic ministries and agencies.
The EPB was like a "super-ministry" equipped with strategic functions, such as development planning, national budget management, and management of aid, foreign capital (borrowing), and technology. Moreover, its head was given the rank of deputy prime minister, and he chaired the Economic Ministers' Council and directly reported to the president. It was in existence for 33 years before being suddenly dissolved in 1994. [5] A major policy instrument in the industrial strategy have been the five-year economic plans. From 1962 to 1992, the government had formulated and implemented seven Five Year Plans for Economic Development, which set targets and allocated resources to achieve the objectives of industrial transformation and export-led growth. The five-year plans supported the creation of domestic capabilities by orchestrating action across several fields, such as industry and technology, trade, education and infrastructure.
The five-year plans sought national agreement on the direction of medium-and long-term policies by harmonizing various views from different segments of society. Usually, individual government ministries and agencies designed their own goals and strategies within the realm of their own mandates, and the EPB took the role of social planner by coordinating those plans and thereby designing a final comprehensive plan that was coherent at the national level.
In the earlier phases of Korean economic development, the government took the leading role in formulating the five-year plans. The major issues of the plans were sector investments and mobilization of domestic and foreign capital to finance such investments. Each of the five-year plans identified key objectives, introduced selective policies and directed resources Table 2 to achieve them. As the economy grew and the economic structures became more complex, the government-led economic development strategy became less effective (see Table 5 ).
Hence, since the 1980s, the five-year plan has evolved from a "directive" into an "indicative" plan that respects the initiative and the creativity of the private sector. The plans implemented in earlier years focused on expanding the productive capacity and mobilizing the required resources, whereas in later years, industrial rationalization and macroeconomic stabilization aimed to make the economy more efficient and productive. Lessons from the "Miracle on the Han River"
Korea's economic miracle is referred to at times as the "Miracle on the Han River". The phrase refers to the river which flows through the capital, Seoul, and the allusion is to an earlier, impressive rebirth of a country similarly devastated by a war, in this case the Second World War, namely the West German economy, the "Miracle on the Rhine". What lessons can we draw from Korea's industrialization experience? Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) made the observation that, because of Korea's rapid economic growth, any big idea in development economics had to encompass Korea before it could become conventional wisdom: "Was Korea outward oriented or protectionist? Export promotion policy suggested outward oriented, while import protection suggested protectionist. Was Korea government-led or market-friendly? Examination of the mechanics of government direction of the economy suggested government-led; the use of the private sector as the instrument of investment and the role of business councils suggested market-friendly. Was Korea's growth Big Push or private sector-and productivity-led? This issue sparked generations of debate about Korea's total factor productivity (TFP). . .Those who argued that Korea proved that Big Push accumulation can lead to rapid growth tended to stress a low TFP, while those who emphasized the private sector role found a high TFP. Even when it was agreed that the Korean government intervened in growth, the question arose of whether that intervention was rules-based or discretionary. . ." (pp.15-6) As the authors point out, these debates were often less about what Korea actually did than about what label to apply to Korea and then sell to other nations eager to emulate Korea's success.
In a similar vein, though referring to East Asia --but which applies to Korea as well -- Rodrik (1999) notes that the region has long served as the "Rorschach test" for economists. Observers with a favorable take on industrial policy saw in it a confirmation of their theories on the importance of state intervention. Free market advocates saw instead the triumph of small government. Trade economists viewed it as a miracle based on outward orientation, labor economists stressed the early emphasis on education, and macroeconomists pointed to its fiscal conservatism. Growth theorists debated the respective contributions of human capital, physical capital, and technology adoption.
In the debate on the role of state intervention, there are those who argue, that for all of the apparent government intervention, Korea's economic polices were market-conforming. Industrial targeting and foreign trade interventions canceled each other out in ways that made Korea behave much like a liberalized economy. As we showed above in our brief overview of Korean economic growth, as per capita income grew and the complexity of the economy increased, government responded by withdrawing from many of its specific targeted interventions in favor of more general macro controls over the economy.
As Perkins (1997) notes, all sides of the major controversies surrounding Korea's economic growth have, in a sense, been partly correct. But no single view is correct for all periods of Korea's development experience. The Korean economy and economic policy in the first half of the 1990s was very different from what it was in the 1960s and 1970s.
At the start of this essay we made mention of the Growth Commission's selection of 13 economic "success stories". The object of the exercise by the commission was to find the common ingredients of these economies, and five "striking points of resemblance" are listed. One of the five points is that they let markets allocate resources.
[6] As a Korean economist commented, "conspicuously missing from the list is the use of nonmarket measures to coordinate productive activities, facilitate industrial upgrading and innovation, and cope with external shocks" (Lim 2011) . However, in fairness to the commission, it did include the point that these economies had committed, credible, and capable governments. Krueger and Yoo (2002) and Devieux (2013) 
